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Cross Dressing and the Criminal
I. Bennett Capers*
INTRODUCTION
The beginning of all Wisdom is to look fixedly on Clothes, or even with
armed eyesight, till they become transparent.
-Thomas Carlyle'
Without a doubt, feminism continues to require its own forms of serious
play.
- Judith Butler'
Notwithstanding its title, this Article is only somewhat about transves-
tites who commit bone-chilling crimes. Those fictional characters we
know so well-Norman Bates in Psycho,3 who dons his dead mother's
clothes before offing his female victims; Dr. Robert Elliott in Dressed to
Kill,4 who shares a split personality with a razor wielding transvestite;
Buffalo Bill in The Silence of the Lambs, 5 who so desperately wants to in-
habit a woman's body that he literally flays his female victims for their
skin, "making himself a girl suit out of real girls"6-these characters make
appearances in this Article, but play second stage. Ditto for real life sto-
ries of cross dressing murderers like Alice Mitchell who, in 1892, cross
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1. THOMAS CARLYLE, SARTOR RESARTUS 52 (Oxford Univ. Press 1987) (1830-31).
2. JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY, at viii
(1999).
3. PSYCHO (Paramount Pictures 1960).
4. DRESSED To KILL (Filmways Pictures 1980).
5. THE SILENCE OF THE LAMBS (Orion Pictures 1991).
6. This quote comes from the novel on which the film was based. See THOMAS HARRIS, THE
SILENCE OF THE LAMBS 149 (1988).
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dressed as a man, proposed marriage to her beloved, and then proceeded to
slit her beloved's throat.7 These fictional and non-fictional cases raise in-
teresting criminal law issues, such as the requirement of a voluntary act,
and the defenses of extreme emotional disturbance and diminished capac-
ity, to name a few. Those issues, however, are not the focus of this Arti-
cle.
Similarly, this Article is only somewhat about Lord Cornbury, Governor
of the Royal Provinces of New York and New Jersey from 1702 to 1708,
who was not only a criminally corrupt politician (so they say), but also a
very public cross dresser (so they say). As one observer put it, "His dress-
ing himself in women's clothes was so unaccountable that if hundred[s] of
spectators did not daily see him it would be incredible." 8 Another critic
lodged a complaint with the Secretary of State, demanding that something
be done about Lord Cornbury's "dressing publicly in woman's clothes
every day." 9 Lord Cornbury is even said to have opened the Assembly in
women's dress. When "some of those about him remonstrated, his reply
was, 'You are very stupid not to see the propriety of it. In this place and
particularly on this occasion I represent a woman [the Queen] and ought in
all respects to represent her as faithfully as I can.""'  Whether he was
dressed in women's clothes when he allegedly misappropriated funds from
the state coffers is, alas, not known.
Only narrowly, too, is this Article about the trial of Joan of Arc, perhaps
the most famous cross dresser of all time. Joan of Arc refused to marry the
man her parents had chosen for her, and instead cut her hair, threw off her
feminine clothes, cross dressed as a knight, and embarked on a religious
crusade for which she became famous. It was her cross dressing that riled
her inquisitors to no end, not her supposed heresy. It was her cross dress-
ing that appeared repeatedly in the charges against her: "That said [Joan]
put off and entirely abandoned woman's clothes, with her hair cropped
short and round in the fashion of young men, she wore shirt, breeches,
doublet, with hose joined together .... II
And it was her persistence in cross dressing, even when bribed with the
right to hear mass if only she would dress like a woman, that arguably led
to her execution. Her obstinacy is clear in the final charge against her, the
one filed after she recanted, agreed to don female clothing, but then re-
7. See Lisa Duggin, The Trial of Alice Mitchell, 18 SIGNS 791 (1993).
8. See Letter from Robert Livingstone to Mr. Lowndes, in 3 CALENDAR OF TREASURY PAPERS,
1702-07, at 512 (Joseph Redington ed., 1874).
9. See Letter from Lewis Morris to the Secretary of State (Feb. 7, 1707/8) in 11 DOCUMENTS
RELATIVE TO THE COLONIAL HISTORY OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK 538 (E.B. O'Callaghan ed.,
1855).
10. See I LORD SYLVESTER DOUGLAS GLENBERVIE, THE DIARIES OF SYLVESTER DOUGLAS
(LORD GLENBERVIE) 77 (Francis Bickley ed., 1928).
11. THE TRIAL OF JEANNE D'ARC 152-53 (W.P. Barrett trans., 1931).
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sumed male apparel as soon as she thought the inquisitors' backs were
turned. That charge alleged, "she had worn them and still wears them...
to such an extent that this woman had declared she would rather die than
relinquish these clothes."' 2 Joan of Arc, obstinate Joan, cross dressing
Joan, was promptly executed. Only later, after her execution, would she
be canonized, joining a surprisingly long list of other cross dressing
saints. 13
Finally, in only a narrow sense is this Article about the trial of Shi Pei
Pu and former French diplomat M. Boursicot of M. Butterfly fame. 4 Or
for that matter, about judges in drag, I mean robes,' 5 or English barristers
in wigs,' 6 or the recent sentencing of two men requiring them to wear
dresses down Main Street in Ohio. 7
Discursively, this Article is informed by all of these things. However,
its focus is at once more general, and more specific. In general, this Article
is about the role of dress and appearance in criminal law. It is about at-
tending to dress and appearance as sign systems with consequences in the
criminal arena, from the bank robber who is identified by his ski mask or
balaclava in summer, to the teenager who raises reasonable suspicion, and
thus becomes suspect, because of his baggy jeans and hooded sweatshirt,
to the rape victim who is doubted, and thus somehow raises reasonable
doubt, because of how she was dressed. As such, the first part of this Arti-
cle takes up Carlyle's injunction that we "look fixedly on Clothes." It ex-
amines the role the criminal law has played in regulating dress, from
sumptuary laws to laws prohibiting cross dressing to judicially sanctioned
assumptions about dress and appearance. And it examines how in regulat-
ing dress, these laws and assumptions also policed, and continue to police,
boundaries of gender, class, and race.
Drawing upon feminist and literary theory, the second part of this Arti-
12. Id. at 227-28,
13. As Marjorie Garber put it in her exploration of cross dressing, "transvestite female saints of
the Middle Ages were legion as well as legend." MARJORIE GARBER, VESTED INTERESTS: CROSS-
DRESSING AND CULTURAL ANXIETY 213 (1992).
14. Boursicot was accused of passing French government secrets to his lover Shi Pei Pu, a Chi-
nese opera star whom he believed for twenty years to be female but in fact was a cross dressing male.
The story became the basis for the play and subsequent film M. Butterfly. For more on this case, see
Joyce Wadler, The True Story of M. Butterfly: The Spy Who Fell in Love with a Shadow, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 15, 1993, at A30.
15. Of course, judges have appeared in actual drag. Chief Justice John Roberts, for example, per-
formed in drag in his high school's production of You're a Good Man, Charlie Brown. Justice Rob-
erts played Peppermint Patty. See http://www.courttv.com/news/supreme/091405_robertsfactsctv
.html.
16. On this practice, which persists in England and many Commonwealth countries, including
those in Africa and the Caribbean, see Charles M. Yablon, Judicial Drag: An Essay on Wigs, Robes
and Legal Change, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1129.
17. See Tim Doulin, Some Judges Fashion Punishment to Fit Crime, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Nov.
28, 2001, at C 13 (describing shaming punishment of two men who had thrown beer bottles at a car and
were rude to the woman driving the car).
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cle narrows its focus to cross dressing.' 8  It argues that, by definition,
cross dressing troubles the assumed binary relation between "men" and
"women" and shows that gender 9 is labile. Cross dressing plays with the
very terms "man" and "woman," destabilizing them, and prompts the
onlooker to question whether the terms are biological or constructed. In
doing so, it problematizes the assumption that gender follows sex. Indeed,
as literary theorist Marjorie Garber has observed, the figure of the cross
dresser signals the instability of categories themselves, functioning as a
"critique of binary thinking, whether particularized as male and female,
black and white, yes and no, Republican and Democrat, self and other, or
in any other way."2 It does so by prompting the onlooker to rethink as-
sumptions about categories. This is especially true when we extend cross
dressing to encompass not only cross gender dressing, but also cross
class/status/race dressing as well, a project I take up in this section. Cross
dressing then, as a metaphor, as a sign, as a practice, has the potential to
question not only expectations about gender, but also expectations about
race, sexuality, class, status, and so on. The second part of this Article
concludes by taking up Judith Butler's suggestion that feminism could
benefit from serious play. But not just feminism. Serious play, I think,
can do a lot for revealing and challenging racism, heterosexism, classism,
whatever-ism one can name.
The third and final part of this Article offers a starting point for putting
theory to work. It does this by proffering cross dressing, or more specifi-
cally the imaginative act of cross dressing others, as a practice to disrupt
inappropriate biases in the criminal arena. Such imaginative acts, I argue,
would not only have the salutary effect of foregrounding such biases. It
would also allow decision makers to override them. To illustrate how such
imaginative acts of cross dressing might work in practice, this part ends by
using cross dressing to reexamine and re-imagine a range of criminal law
cases, from the highly publicized prosecutions of Martha Stewart and O.J.
Simpson, to sexual assault and death penalty cases.
When I was five or six, or maybe seven, while my older sister played
dress-up in our mother's clothes and earrings, and my older brother ran
18. The term "cross dressing," of course, suggests different things to different people. As Bul-
lough and Bullough observed, cross dressing is "a simple term for a complex set of phenomena. It
ranges from simply wearing one or two items of clothing to a full-scale burlesque, from a comic im-
personation to a serious attempt to pass as the opposite gender, from an occasional desire to experi-
ment with gender identity to attempting to live most of one's life as a member of the opposite sex."
VERN L. BULLOUGH & BONNIE BULLOUGH, CROSS DRESSING, SEX, AND GENDER, at vii (1993). Here,
I use the term to encompass all of these gender crossings, since they all challenge binary gender roles.
I also extend the term to include other crossings of socio-cultural boundaries.
19. By gender, I am referring to socially constructed identities such as masculine or feminine. By
contrast, sex refers to biological distinctions. Part of the task of my work has been to decouple gender
from sex. See, e.g., 1. Bennett Capers, Sex(ual Orientation) and Title VII, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1158
(1991).
20. GARBER, supra note 13, at 10-11.
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about shouting "Bang! Bang!" in his cowboy outfit, I played with paper
dolls, transfixed by the transformations I could create by merely substitut-
ing one paper outfit for another. It was similar to Cinderella's transforma-
tion from a poor stepsister to a princess through the magic of a gown to
wear to the ball, or a wolf transforming himself into Little Red Riding
Hood's grandmamma by donning a frilly nightcap, or perhaps even more
insidious, dressing himself in sheep's clothing. Years later, maybe I was
eight or nine, my sister and I spent days on end playing a board game
called Mystery Date. The object was to choose the right guy. The thing is,
there was only one guy in the game. He was just dressed differently de-
pending on the role of the dice. The object was to get him in a tuxedo, be-
cause this established him as having a certain class, a certain status, a cer-
tain presence. Of course the guy in the game was white, blond and blue-
eyed, but it would be years before I would reflect upon these racial, class,
gender, and sexuality implications. Just as it would be years before I
would wonder if Cinderella could have been prosecuted for violating
sumptuary laws. Back then, it was only the magic of clothes I noted.
Magic that could be subversive, like Bugs Bunny in drag to outwit Elmer
Fudd, or like a Tellytubby brandishing a purse. Transvestic, transgressive,
transformative. And then, just when I thought I was beginning to under-
stand that magic, to see through clothes or, as Carlyle would say, render
them transparent, just when I was beginning to see through these games,
my parents impressed upon me that I should put away these childish
things.
Now, I'm bringing them out again.
I. To LOOK FIXEDLY ON CLOTHES
People are embarrassed and rather afraid to take seriously anything to
do with dress and appearance.
-Colin McDowell21
What a strange power there is in clothing.
-I.B. Singer, "Yentl the Yeshiva Boy"22
As the first epigraph above suggests, dress and appearance are rarely
taken seriously. They are consigned to low art, not high.23 They are the
stuff of fashion magazines, newspaper ads, billboards, and the occasional
21. COLIN McDOWELL, DRESSED TO KILL: SEX POWER AND CLOTHES 8 (1992).
22. I.B. SINGER, YENTL THE YESHIVA BOY (Antonio Frasconi trans., 1983) (1962).
23. This is especially true of fashion. See Guy Trebay, Admit It. You Love It. It Matters, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 2007, at C I (observing that for many, fashion is "bourgeois, girly, unfeminist, con-
formist, elitist, frivolous, anti-intellectual and a cultural stepchild barely worth the attention paid to
even the most minor arts").
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museum show, but rarely of scholarly journals, let alone journals devoted
to the law.24 As I hope to demonstrate below, it is well past time that we
took clothes seriously.
Clothing, after all, is communication: something that can be said, some-
thing that can be understood, something that can be read. Or, as Roland
Barthes observed in "The Disease of Costume," dress itself is a kind of
writing. 25 No one has put this more succinctly, I think, or more clearly,
than Alison Lurie in The Language of Clothes.26
For thousands of years human beings have communicated with one an-
other first in the language of dress. Long before I am near enough to talk
to you on the street, in a meeting, or at a party, you announce your sex,
age and class to me through what you are wearing-and very possibly
give me important information (or misinformation) as to your occupation,
origin, personality, opinions, tastes, sexual desires, and current mood. I
may not be able to put what I observe into words, but I register the infor-
mation unconsciously; and you simultaneously do the same for me. By
the time we meet and converse we have already spoken to each other in an
older and more universal tongue.27
Moreover, like language, dress has its own syntax and grammar. Con-
sider opposite buttoning to mark gender. Or the proscription against wear-
ing white after Labor Day. Or that men should wear suits to court. Or
blue for baby boys, and pink for baby girls. Or that red ties are de rigueur
for male politicians. The semiotics of clothes is particularly evident when
it comes to uniforms. From the black robes worn by members of the
bench to the orange prison garb worn by inmates, from the work clothes of
"blue collar" workers to the suits of "white collar" workers, from the polo
shirts of preppies to the funereal black of goths, from the uniforms of blue
worn by police officers to the bandannas of red and yellow worn by gang
members, uniforms allow one, at a glance, to know the wearer's status,
rank, grade, tribe, milieu, beliefs, values, etc. To know who has more
power and who has less. To respond accordingly.
This is what I want to suggest: the law has played a significant role in
policing the language of dress, at first with explicit laws, and now with
implicit ones. And in doing so, the law has been anything but non-
partisan. To the contrary, by regulating clothes and appearance, the law
24. The exception is in articles discussing dress and appearance in the context of employment
discrimination. See, e.g., KENJI YOSHINO, COVERING (2006); Katharine T. Bartlett, Only Girls Wear
Barrettes: Dress and Appearance Standards, Community Norms, and Workplace Equality, 92 MICH.
L. REV. 2541 (1994); Michael Selmi, The Many Faces ofDarleneJespersen, 14 DUKE J. GENDER L. &
POL'Y 467 (2007); Mary Whiner, Gender-Specific Clothing Regulation: A Study in Patriarchy, 5
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 73 (1982).
25. Roland Barthes, The Disease of Costume, PARTISAN REVIEW, Oct. 1967.
26. ALISON LURIE, THE LANGUAGE OF CLOTHES (1981).
27. Id. at 3; see also RUTH P. RUBINSTEIN, DRESS CODES: MEANINGS AND MESSAGES IN
AMERICAN CULTURE 6-7 (1995) (using semiotics to decode the vocabulary of dress).
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has also functioned to reify hierarchies of sex, class, race, and sexuality.
Consider our history of sumptuary laws. Throughout Europe during the
medieval and early modem periods, cities, towns, and nation states rou-
tinely promulgated laws that regulated who wore what, and on what occa-
sion. These sumptuary laws-the term sumptuary relating to consump-
tion-were not limited to minimizing consumption or even conspicuous
consumption. Rather, they "manifested an aspiration to construct an 'or-
der of appearance' that allowed the relevant social facts, in particular
about social and economic status, gender and occupation to be 'read' from
the visible signs disclosed by the clothes on the wearer."2 8 More impor-
tantly, many of these laws served to inscribe and police social boundaries.
Consumption was monitored, but so was assumption. It was not only that
those of a lower status should not adorn themselves with the clothes or ac-
coutrements of their betters; it was also that, by so clothing themselves,
those of the lower classes would not assume the status of their betters.29
This emphasis on clothing was especially true in England during the
reign of Queen Elizabeth, who issued more royal brevets concerning dress
than any prior monarch,3" and who seemed particularly concerned with
eradicating the "confusion of degree, where the meanest are as richly
dressed as their betters."'" Her proclamation of 1597 is illustrative. It
proscribed not so much what people could wear, as what they could not,
depending on their rank and station. Thus, the order proclaimed that
"none shall wear cloth of gold, silver tissued, silk of purple color... ex-
cept.., earls and above that rank and Knights of the Garter in their purple
mantles."32 An accompanying edict applied to women: "none shall wear
any cloth in silver in kirtles only ... except knights' wives and all above
that rank."33 The proclamation continued with other dress prohibitions,
from materials for headdresses, netherstocks, jerkins, hose, and doublets,
depending on whether one was an earl or count or gentleman or had an
annual income of 500 marks or more, or fell in some station in between. 34
This tradition of regulating status through clothing continued in colonial
America. A 1651 Massachusetts law, for example, prohibited those with
annual incomes of less than £200 from wearing gold, silver lace or but-
tons, silk hoods, or "great boots." 35
28. ALAN HUNT, GOVERNANCE OF THE CONSUMING PASSIONS: A HISTORY OF SUMPTUARY LAW
42 (1996).
29. GARBER, supra note 13, at 26.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. The Colonial Laws of Massachusetts, Reprinted from the Edition of 1660, at 123 (Boston,
1889).
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Sumptuary laws even played a role in regulating race. A 1430 Venetian
order, for example, mandated that all Jews identify themselves as Jewish
by wearing on their chests yellow circles of cord; Rome required that male
Jews wear red tabards and female Jews red overskirts.36 In this country,
sumptuary laws limited the type of clothing that could be worn by black
slaves. South Carolina's slave code, for example, mandated that slaves
could only wear "negro cloth, duffelds, coarse kearsies, osnabrigs, blue
linen, checked linen or coarse garlix or calicoes, checked cottons, or
scotch plaids, not exceeding ten shillings per yard for the said checked
cottons, scotch plaids, garlix or calico."37 It was not enough that their skin
marked them subordinate in the eyes of whites; their clothing had to mark
them as subordinate as well.3 8
But gender is what I keep coming back to. Even the Elizabethan brevets
regulated gender to a degree-different proscriptions applied to the dress
of women-and thus reified the notion that sex was hierarchical, that gen-
der followed from sex, and that sex/gender should be apparent from
clothes. Moreover, after we ceased, at least officially, to regulate class
and race through apparel, we continued to regulate gender. We did so, at
least in part, by passing laws prohibiting cross dressing.
Between 1850 and 1870, just as the abolitionist movement, then the
Civil War, and then Reconstruction were disrupting the subordi-
nate/superordinate balance between blacks and whites, just as middle class
white women were demanding social and economic equality, agitating for
the right to vote, and quite literally asserting their right to wear pants,39
and just as lesbian and gay subcultures were emerging in large cities,4" ju-
risdictions began passing sumptuary legislation which had the effect of
reifying sex and gender distinctions.41 Many ordinances explicitly prohib-
ited cross dressing. In Chicago, for example, it became a crime to "appear
in a public place in a state of nudity, or in a dress not belonging to his or
her sex."42 In Toledo, Ohio, it became a crime for any "perverted person"
to appear in clothing belonging to the opposite sex.4 3 Similar cross dress-
ing prohibitions were adopted in Columbus, Houston, San Francisco, St.
36. Diane Owen Hughes, Distinguishing Signs: Ear-Rings, Jews and Franciscan Rhetoric in the
Italian Renaissance City, 112 PAST & PRESENT 3, 17-18, 47 (1986). These laws prefigured the yellow
stars of David imposed on Jews under Nazi law.
37. ACT OF 1735, reprinted in 7 STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, at 396.
38. A. LEON HIGGINBOTHAM, JR., IN THE MATTER OF COLOR: RACE AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL
PROCESS, THE COLONIAL PERIOD 174 (1978).
39. For a discussion of the movement among early feminists to wear pants, see KARLYNE
ANSPACH, THE WHY OF FASHION 329-30 (1967), describing the "Bloomerism" movement, champi-
oned in the feminist journal The Lily by Mrs. Dexter Bloomer.
40. See generally JONATHAN NED KATZ, GAY AMERICAN HISTORY (1976).
41. WILLIA N. ESKRIDGE, JR., GAYLAW: CHALLENGING THE APARTHEID OF THE CLOSET 3, 20
(1999).
42. Id. at 27.
43. Toledo's 'Pervert Drag' Law Voided, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 7, 1973, at 16.
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Louis, Kansas City, and dozens of other cities." Other jurisdictions
passed ordinances that were less explicit in language in prohibiting cross
dressing, but nonetheless explicit in effect. New York's law prohibited
individuals from assembling "disguised" in public places; California
passed a law that prohibited an individual from "masquerading" in another
person's attire for unlawful purposes.4 5 Both laws were used to, target
cross dressers.
And these laws, buttressed by catch-all vagrancy laws, were enforced.
In People v. Archibald,4 6 for example, Archibald was arrested and con-
victed of impersonation for wearing "a white evening dress, high heel
shoes, blonde wig, female garments, and facial make up."47 It did not help
his case that he also winked at a male police officer. In State v. William,48
Henrietta William was arrested when she was spotted "with a basket of
splinters and a bottle of kerosene oil ... and dressed in man's clothes." It
was the men's clothing that angered the arresting officers. When she de-
nied being a woman, the police threatened to strip her. These reported
cases are just a fraction of the actual arrests. We know, for example, that
in just one year, 1977, Houston police arrested and charged fifty-three
people with dressing to disguise their sex.4 9
Nan Hunter has argued that the goal of these cross dressing prohibitions
was to prohibit gender fraud, often by women posing as men to gain eco-
nomic or social advantage. 50 Bill Eskridge, on the other hand, has posited
that the purpose of these regulations was to stamp out gender deviance,
and sexual deviance.51 Whatever the goal, these laws had the effect of in-
scribing diamorphic gender divisions, enforcing a disciplinary production
of gender. Being an adult male meant that one must dress like a man. Be a
man. Being an adult female meant that one must dress like a woman. Be
a woman. More importantly, it meant that these divisions had to be read-
ily visible, and maintained. Let me try to put this in even clearer terms.
Cross dressing prohibitions did not just impact cross dressers, or even
"butch" women or "effeminate" men. The prohibitions signaled to every-
one what dress, and what behavior, was appropriate. It was not enough
that in every government form, in every government census, an answer
was demanded: male or female. One had to act and appear it too.52
44. ESKRIDGE, supra note 41, at 27.
45. Id.
46. 296 N.Y.S.2d 834, 836 (App. Term 1968).
47. Id. at 836.
48. 71 S.E. 832 (S.C. 1911).
49. Doe v. McCann, 489 F. Supp. 76 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
50. ESKRIDGE, supra note 41, at 27 (citing Nan D. Hunter, Gender Disguise and the Law (unpub-
lished manuscript)).
51. Id.
52. An analogy can be drawn to prohibitions against same-sex marriage. Such prohibitions not
only impact the behavior of lesbians and gays, but heterosexuals as well, by valorizing and privileging
2008]
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Of course, official prohibitions against cross dressing have, for the most
part,53 gone the way of other sumptuary laws. Though in Mayes v.
Texas,54 the Supreme Court refused to hear an appeal from a decision up-
holding the constitutionality of a "disguise ordinance," lower courts had
no such qualms. These courts began to invalidate such statutes relying not
on Mayes, but on cases such as Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,5 5 in
which the Court invalidated an ordinance that criminalized "vagrancy" as
unconstitutionally vague.56 In City of Columbus v. Rogers,57 for example,
the Ohio Supreme Court found an ordinance prohibiting "dress not be-
longing to his or her sex" to be too vague given current dress habits. Simi-
lar challenges resulted in ordinances being struck down in Chicago, Cin-
cinnati, Detroit, Fort Worth, Miami Beach, St. Louis, and other
jurisdictions.58
Still, the effect of these laws-like an imprint-is with us. As Alan
Hunt has convincingly argued in his study of sumptuary law, the regula-
tion of dress persists, but is now dispersed throughout a range of both pub-
lic and private forms of governance. 59 This seems especially true in our
requirement of gender specific clothes and appearance. In schools. 60  In
the military.6  In the workplace.62  In the courtroom. 63  In legislative
one type of love over another, and by giving a type of imprimatur to traditional sex roles.
53. Arrests still occur, as evidenced by the recent arrest of a bikini-wearing firefighter in Ohio.
According to police, the firefighter was wearing a blonde wig, pink flip-flops, a striped bikini, and was
seen driving, and then walking erratically. In addition to being charged with drunken driving, the fire-
fighter was also charged with public indecency and disorderly conduct. Firefighter's Jam Not Pretty,
CHi. SUN-TIMEs, Apr. 6, 2007, at Al.
54. 416 U.S. 909 (1974) (denying certiorari). Mayes, who appeared in public in women's cloth-
ing, was convicted of violating an ordinance that prohibited cross dressing. He unsuccessfully sought
to appeal his conviction on the grounds that his conviction was in violation of the eighth amendment
and his right to privacy. See Respondent's Brief in Opposition, Mayes v. Texas, 94 S.Ct. 1617 (1974)
(No. 73-627).
55. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
56. Id. at 158-59.
57. 324 N.E.2d 563, 565 (Ohio 1975).
58. D.C. v. City of St. Louis, 795 F.2d 652 (8th Cir. 1986); City of Chicago v. Wilson, 389
N.E.2d 522 (Ill. 1978); City of Cincinnati v. Adams, 330 N.E.2d 463 (Ohio. Mun. 1974).
59. HUNT, supra note 28, at xviii.
60. Most recently, the issue has come up in terms of girls being prohibited from wearing tuxe-
does, and boys being prohibited from wearing gowns, to prom. In one case, police escorted cross
dressing students from the prom. A court rejected their claim that their equal protection rights were
violated. Harper v. Edgewood Bd. of Educ., 655 F. Supp. 1355 (S.D. Ohio 1987).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 26 M.J. 445 (C.M.A. 1988) (affirming court martial of male
officers for wearing women's clothing "to the prejudice of good order and discipline); United States v.
Guerrero, 31 M.J. 692 (C.M.R. 1990) (affirming the court martial of an officer who "wrongfully
dressed in women's clothing" to the prejudice of good order and discipline).
62. E.g., Jespersen v. Harrah's Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (upholding
the casino's policy requiring women beverage servers to wear make-up and prohibiting male beverage
servers from wearing make-up); Fountain v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 555 F.3d 753 (9th Cir. 1977) (up-
holding a policy requiring male employees to wear ties); Willingham v. Macon Tel. Publ'n Co., 507
F.2d 1084 (5th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (upholding policy imposing different hair lengths on males and
females).
63. E.g., Sandstrom v. Florida, 336 So. 2d 572 (Fla. 1976) (declining to hear appeal of male attor-
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halls.' Even at the altar. 65
Indeed, the imprint of our entire history of sumptuary laws still seems to
be with us. Moreover, this imprint implicates troubling issues of class,
race, sex, and sexuality. Consider the criminal arena. In too many juris-
dictions, a black man driving a BMW or Lexus-that ultimate luxury
item, that ultimate accessory, that ultimate item of conspicuous consump-
tion-still seems to raise reasonable suspicion, justifying a stop, justifying
questions.66 Ditto for a black kid dressed in baggy pants and a hoodie,67
or a group of Hispanics with an expensive camcorder. 68 A woman not
dressed "like a lady" still seems to justify reasonable doubt in rape prose-
cutions. 69 A man not dressed "like a man" can still, in too many jurisdic-
tions, be assaulted with impunity, especially if he is a man of color.7" And
notwithstanding official admonishments that law enforcement witnesses
are entitled to no more weight than the testimony of lay witnesses,7' we
still tend to take officers in blue at their word, take their word as truth,
even when there is evidence to the contrary.72
All of this, somehow, makes me think of cross dressing.
Maybe because of the irony of the linkage between the concept of the
closet, which Eve Kosofsky Sedwick explored so eloquently in her
ground-breaking Epistemology of the Closet, and the idea that the closet,
before it was identified as a place where identities were concealed, was
ney convicted of contempt for refusing to wear a tie in court); In re DeCarlo, 357 A.2d 273 (Sup. Ct.
App. Div. 1976) (holding a female attorney wearing "wool gray slacks, a matching gray sweater, and a
green shirt" in contempt for improper attire).
64. In 1986, the South Carolina Legislative Assembly passed a rule requiring male staff members
to wear jackets and ties, and female staff members to wear skirts. See Valerie Steele, Clothing and
Sexuality, in MEN AND WOMEN: DRESSING THE PART (Claudia Brush Kidwell & Valerie Steele eds.,
1989).
65. Until 1976, women were required to wear skirts or dresses and men jackets to be married by
the Clerk of the City of New York. The City ended this policy in response to a lawsuit. See Rappa-
port v. Katz, 380 F. Supp. 808 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); J. AREEN, FAMILY LAW 51-52 (1978).
66. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, Crime, Legitimacy, and Testilying, 83 IND. L.J. (forthcoming
2008) (surveying "driving while black" statistics and literature).
67. See, e.g., State v. Miglavs, 90 P.3d 607 (Or. 2004) (suggesting that officers based pat down, at
least in part, on fact that individual was wearing untucked baggy clothing that officers associated with
gang attire); see also Christopher Dunn, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties, N.Y. L.J. ONLINE, Feb. 27,
2007 (reporting that New York's stop and frisk data reveals many stops based on individuals' street
attire).
68. Oliveira v. Mayer, 23 F.3d 642, 644 (2d Cir. 1994) (describing the arrest of three Hispanics
after police received call that the men were handling an expensive video camera while driving a di-
lapidated station wagon through an affluent area of North Stamford, Connecticut).
69. See Theresa L. Lennon, Sharron J. Lennon, & Kim K.P. Johnson, Is Clothing Probative of
Attitude or Intent? Implications for Rape and Sexual Harassment Cases, II LAW & INEQ. 391 (1993).
70. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Out Yet Unseen: A Racial Critique of Gay and Lesbian The-
ory, 29 CONN. L. REV. 561 (1997) (describing acts of violence against gay men of color). Sometimes,
the perpetrators of such assaults are the police themselves. See Steve Rosen, Police Harassment of
Homosexual Women and Men, 12 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 159 (1980).
71. See, e.g., LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., 1 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 7-
16 (providing instructions for weighing the testimony of law enforcement witnesses).
72. See 1. Bennett Capers, Crime, supra note 66.
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already a place where identifying clothes were kept. Clothes that doubled
as uniforms, costumes, outfits, masks. Clothes that spoke volumes. Speak
volumes.
Maybe because I know that clothes are often associated with magical
power. Revival Zionists, for example, wear gowns of different colors to
perform ceremonies: a blue gown to summon an individual spirit, a white
gown to work "in purity."73  In obeah, priests and priestesses wear red
flannel shirts or a crosspiece of red. They also occasionally wear gold ear-
rings, which they believe allow them to see duppies, or what we would re-
fer to as spirits.74 Some followers of obeah also believe that burning a
person's clothing can cause the owner's skin to burn; that sewing a button
on a piece of clothing in a certain manner can bring about the owner's
death; and that putting a red ribbon on a newborn will keep away evil spir-
its.75 The Ashanti of Africa wear beads to ward off evil spirits.76 Women
in my family clutch rosary beads.
Maybe because I am thinking back to my earlier life as a federal prose-
cutor, those years when, by necessity, theory took a backseat to practice.
Back then, before every trial, I would think about what I wanted to wear
during jury selection, what I wanted to wear during my opening statement,
what I wanted to wear during my summation. Part of me knowing that the
outcome of the trial was not unrelated to what my clothes said, to whether
I instructed my law enforcement officers to dress in uniform or in plain
clothes, to how the defense lawyer instructed the defendant to dress. Race
and gender mattered too. Clothes, though, could be changed.
Maybe because every time I think of the paper dolls I played with when
I was six or seven, I also think of that more famous use of dolls: the "doll
studies" that played such a role in Brown v. Board of Education.77 In their
studies, a pair of sociologists found that black children presented with oth-
erwise identical black and white dolls tended to describe the white doll as
"nice" and the black doll as looking "bad. ' 78 The Court in Brown relied
on these studies to conclude that segregation was generating "a feeling of
inferiority" in the children.79 I also think about the fact that this study was
just replicated, some fifty years after Brown, with the same results.8"
73. STEEVE 0. BUCKRIDGE, THE LANGUAGE OF DRESS: RESISTANCE AND ACCOMMODATION IN
JAMAICA, 1760-1890, at 8 (2004) (citing Joseph Graessle Moore, Religion of Jamaican Negroes: A
Study of Afro-Jamaican Acculturation (1953) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Northwestern Univer-
sity)).
74. MARTHA BECKWITH, BLACK ROADWAYS: A STUDY OF JAMAICAN FOLK LIFE 108 (1969).
75. Id.; see also BUCKRIDGE, supra note 73, at 9.
76. M.D. MCLEOD, THE ASANTE 145 (1981).
77. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
78. See Kenneth B. Clark & Mamie P. Clark, Racial Identification and Preference in Negro Chil-
dren, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 602 (Eleanor E. Macoby et al. eds., 3d ed. 1958).
79. 347U.S.at494n.11.
80. See Paul Butler, Black and White Dolls: Kenneth Clark's Famous Experiment Updated,
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Somehow, I know this is all related.
Maybe because I know that appearance is not only language, but a lan-
guage that can be manipulated, that can manipulate, that can be political,
that can be transgressive. During the French Revolution, men and women
signaled their resistance to the class system by wearing workingman's
trousers instead of the knee breeches associated with the upper class. 81 In
the 1960s, feminists "burned" bras to symbolize their rejection of cultur-
ally imposed gender restraints.8 2  Such protests are even reflected in our
jurisprudence. Consider Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community
School District,8 3 holding that a student's decision to wear an armband to
school to protest the Vietnam War was protected speech. What interests
me beyond clothing's ability to be transgressive, however, is how manipu-
lating clothing and appearance can ultimately be transformative. How it
can turn the dismissed stepchild Cinderella into a beautiful princess.
Maybe because I know that there is something to cross dressing. That
read broadly, read literally, cross dressing can incorporate not only the
crossing, and blurring, of gender, but also of class, sexuality, status, even
race. After all, read broadly, read literally, shouldn't cross dressing in-
clude any donning of apparel that crosses socio-cultural expectations? In
other words, not just cross gender dressing, but also cross class dressing,
cross status dressing, even cross race dressing. There is a rich history, for
example, of black slaves donning clothes that crossed gender, race, class,
and status in order to escape slavery and evade capture. 84 And if cross
gender dressing can serve as a challenge to traditional assumptions about
gender, can similar challenges be made by cross class/status/race dressing?
It's time for some serious play.
BLACKPROF.COM, Sept. 16, 2006, http://www.blackprof.com/archives/2006/09/
whiteandblackdollskenneth.html.
81. Mary Louise Roberts, Samson and Delilah Revisited: The Politics of Women's Fashion in
1920s France, 98 AM. HIST. REV. 664 (1993).
82. At a Miss America pageant in 1968, a group of women protested the event by throwing their
bras in the trash. This protest was then reported by the media as a bra burning event. The story of
women burning their bras stuck. See J. FREEMAN, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN'S LIBERATION 112
(1975).
83. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
84. Sometimes, this was just a simple act of crossing status, from slave to freeman. For example,
slave women who managed to run away would sometimes cross dress in terms of status in order to
frustrate efforts to recapture them. To facilitate escape and evade recapture then, slave women would
disguise themselves as free or freed women by donning shoes, stockings, and clothes associated with
free and freed blacks. See BUCKRIDGE, supra note 75, at 83. On other occasions, slaves would cross
not only status, from slave to free, but cross gender as well. See, e.g., Fisk v. Bergerot, 21 La. Ann.
111 (1869) (describing female slave who, "disguised in male attire," sailed on a ship owned by defen-
dants). As historian Joan Cashin has observed, "women dressed as men and men as women; girls
dressed as boys and vice versa, sometimes changing gender identities several times to evade slave-
catchers." Joan E. Cashin, Black Families in the Old Northwest, 15 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 456 (1995).
Slaves also used dress to change their race, from black to white, or at least "other." And on occasion,
slaves did a combination of the above. For example, in one well-known case, a black man crossed
genders by dressing in a woman's dress, and crossed races by powdering his face. Id. The male black
slave thus became a free white woman.
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II. SERIOUS PLAY
You're born naked, and the rest is drag.
-RuPau 85
I don't mind drag-women have been female impersonators for some
time.
-Gloria Steinem86
Drag = Blackface
-Kelly Kleiman87
Thinking of cross dressing as play, even using my more expansive
definition, is easy. What are Mardi Gras and masquerade balls if not play?
Likewise Christmas mumming, in its traditional form in England with men
dressing as women and women dressing as men, was play. Certainly when
children play "dress-up," we consider this play. Female impersonators,
often lionized in the gay world for their verbal ripostes and wit, for their
embodiment of "camp," that sensibility Susan Sontag explored so well,88
are at bottom engaging in play. Even minstrel shows, performances in
which men used blackface to caricature blacks, involved play, however
offensive that play was.
In fact, when we think of cross dressing in the narrow sense, cross gen-
der dressing, it is not only play, but plays that come to mind. During the
Middle Ages, the "women" in mystery plays (dramatizations of biblical
stories), miracle plays (dramatizations of miracles of the saints), and pas-
sion plays (depicting the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ) were all
played by either boys or men. Even during Shakespeare's time, male "ac-
tresses" were the norm. Except now the plays occasionally went beyond
the practice of males impersonating women to include, in a grand gesture
of self-referentialism, playful acts of cross dressing. After all, what is
Shakespeare's As You Like It without the comedy of Rosalind in male ap-
parel, or his Twelfth Night without Viola dressed as her brother? Males
playing women playing men.
These days, cross gender dressing seems even more playful. Saturday
Night Live has put a man in frocks on almost a weekly basis, a favorite be-
ing male comedian Dana Carvey's character, the self-righteous "Church
Lady." The show has also featured as a recurring character "Pat," who
85. ROGER BAKER, DRAG: A HISTORY OF FEMALE IMPERSONATION IN THE PERFORMING ARTS
258 (1994).
86. GARBER, supra note 13, at 65. Susan Brownmiller made a similar observation. See SUSAN
BROWNMILLER, FEMININITY 175 (1984) ("Women are all female impersonators to some degree.").
87. Kelly Kleiman, Drag = Blackface, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 669 (2000).
88. SUSAN SONTAG, AGAINST INTERPRETATION AND OTHER ESSAYS 275-92 (1990).
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discombobulates everyone with her gender ambiguity, her genderless
clothes, her very illegibility. Even guest hosts of the show have gotten
into the cross dressing act-for laughs, of course-perhaps most fa-
mously, former New York City mayor Rudy Giuliani. This is to say noth-
ing of the spate of movies featuring men in drag, from Some Like It Hot, to
Tootsie, to Mrs. Doubtfire, to Big Mama's House, to Hairspray, first with
Divine, more recently with John Travolta.
Each of these examples evidences cross dressing as play. What I want to
argue, however, is that while it is useful to think of cross dressing as play,
it is even more useful to think of it as serious play. Let me put this differ-
ently. On the surface, these examples may seem little more than light en-
tertainment, inversions or reversals that provide comic relief to the normal
order of things but do nothing to change the order. Probe deeper, I think,
and many of these examples in fact do question the normal order of
things.89 Put differently, cross dressing does double duty. On one level, it
reinforces by its very difference the comfort of the status quo. On another,
less obvious level, however, cross dressing does the opposite: it under-
mines everything we know, or think we know, beginning with gender. As
anthropologist Esther Newton noted in Mother Camp: Female Impersona-
tors in America:
At its most complex, [drag] is a double inversion that says, "appear-
ance is an illusion." Drag says "my 'outside' appearance is feminine,
but my essence 'inside' is masculine." At the same time it symbolizes
the opposite inversion; "my appearance 'outside' is masculine but my
essence 'inside' is feminine."' 90
Through this double inversion, cross dressing challenges the assumed
binary relation between "men" and "women," destabilizes the very terms
"man" and "woman," and in doing so, renders visible their very construct-
edness. It disrupts the assumption that gender is natural, that gender inevi-
tably follows sex, that gender is anything other than performance.
Consider As You Like It again. The cross dressing Rosalind does more
89. Barbara A. Babcock has observed:
Clown or trickster or transvestite never demands that we reject totally the orders of our sociocul-
tural worlds; but neither do these figures simply provide us with a cautionary note as to what
would happen should the "real" world turn into a perpetual circus or festival.... Rather, they
remind us of the arbitrary condition of imposing an order on our environment and experience,
even while they enable us to see certain features of that order more clearly simply because they
have turned inside out.
Barbara A. Babcock, Introduction to THE REVERSIBLE WORLD: SYMBOLIC INVERSION IN ART AND
SOCIETY 29 (Barbara A. Babcock ed., 1978). The transvestite also recalls the grotesque in Mikhail
Bakhtin's work on the carnivalesque. Bakhtin argues that the carnival grotesque functions as a safety
valve in service of the dominant ideology, and at the same time exceeds and refuses that ideology.
MIKHAIL BAKHTIN, RABELAIS AND HIS WORLD (Helene Iswolsky trans., 1984).
90. ESTHER NEWTON, MOTHER CAMP: FEMALE IMPERSONATORS IN AMERICA 103 (1972).
20081
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
than play for laughs; she also plays with gender expectations, questioning
them, challenging them. Rosalind, dressed in male apparel, is thus able to
set Orlando straight, so to speak, about the limits he will have over a wife.
Or consider Neil Jordan's much-lauded film The Crying Game,9' in which
Stephen Rea plays an IRA soldier on the lam in London where he falls in
love with Dil, only to discover that Dil, ostensibly a "she," is biologically
a "he." The scene of Dil's disrobing/unveiling might get a laugh, but it
also gets something else. It challenges the viewer. That Dil works in a
beauty salon where people are "made up"; that Stephen Rea, in an attempt
to hide Dil from the IRA, temporarily remakes Dil into a boy by dressing
Dil in boy's clothes; that the "other" woman in the film, Miranda Richard-
son, "remakes" herself twice to avoid detection (is she a blonde, is she a
brunette, and who can forget the lingering shot of her in front of a three-
way mirror, applying "make up"?), all serve to foreground the very con-
structedness of gender. One recalls Gloria Steinem's witty comment
about drag: "I don't mind drag-women have been female impersonators
for some time."92
The fact is that cross dressing, both in its narrow sense of cross gender
dressing, and its broader sense of dressing in any manner that crosses
socio-cultural barriers, is almost always engaged in serious play. Subver-
sive play. I am not limiting myself here to overt forms of subversion,
though I could. (The drag troupe known as the "Sisters of Perpetual In-
dulgence" is but one example. Wearing nuns' habits and outsized foam
rubber breasts, the nuns once mocked the religious conservative Jerry
Falwell by stripping the pants off an actor posing as Falwell and revealing
fishnet stockings. 93 The Stonewall Riots, considered the watershed mo-
ment in the evolution of gay rights, is another example. In fact, the riots
were set in motion by cross dressers. 94) Rather, serious play also includes
more subtle forms of subversion, such as drag queens using themselves to
critique gender roles assigned to women and men. 95
It has been said that cross gender dressing is a game of smoke and mir-
rors, now you see it, now you don't. Something akin to Where's Waldo?.
91. THE CRYING GAME (Lions Gate 1992). The film was nominated for several Oscars, including
best picture, best director, best actor, and best supporting actor.
92. GARBER, supra note 13, at 65.
93. Tony Bizjak, The Sobering of Sister Boom Boom, S.F. CHRONICLE, Oct. 24, 1989, at B3.
94. The story of the Stonewall Rebellion of June 1969 has been told often. What occasionally
gets lost in the retelling, however, is the role cross dressers played in the rebellion. Stonewall Inn was
not so much a lesbian and gay club as a club for lesbian and gay cross dressers. During the raid on
June 27, it was a lesbian cross dresser who first struggled with the police, and galvanized other cross
dressers to come to her aid. It was only after the confrontations spilled onto the street that non-cross
dressing lesbians and gays joined the fray. Simply put, the gay rights movement was started by drag
kings and queens.
95. This is not to suggest that drag is never misogynistic. What I do suggest, however, is that
even misogynistic drag engages in gender subversion, gender disruption. I make a similar claim about
minstrelsy, however offensive. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
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Something where "[a]ppearance is repeatedly unmasked as illusion when
the male performer breaks the illusion of femininity by reinvoking the
male body through a change in voice or the removal of a breast. '96 I am
suggesting this and more. That the presence of the cross dresser, even
without the one-liners or witty ripostes, just the presence of the cross
dresser, still, silent, mute, as in Frida Kahlo's Self-Portrait with Cropped
Hair or Romaine Brooks's Una, Lady Troubridge, throws into question
assumptions about the naturalness of gender, and about the naturalness of
gender following from sex, and about the naturalness of our expectations.
It is the spectator who does a double-take, who becomes momentarily
tongue-tied, wondering whether to say he or she, realizing that a dress
does not always signify male, or that a tie does not always signify female.
It is the spectator who reaches a crisis in which, to borrow from Robert
Cover, interpretation and language itself break down.9 7 It is the spectator,
or at least the critical spectator, who is prompted to self-examine, to ask
questions: "Is drag the imitation of gender, or does it dramatize the signi-
fying gestures through which gender itself is established? Does being fe-
male constitute a 'natural fact' or a cultural performance, or is 'natural-
ness' constituted through discursively constrained performative acts that
produce the body through and within the categories of sex?"98 This is
what drag does. Or as another commentator put it, "Drag is the theoretical
and deconstructive social practice that analyzes these structures [gender]
from within, by putting in question the 'naturalness' of gender roles
through the discourse of clothing and body parts."9 9
But here's the thing. Cross dressing, when it is used as serious play, not
only disrupts gender expectations; it also has the potential to disrupt ex-
pectations about class, status, even race. As Marjorie Garber has ob-
served, the cross dresser functions not only as a "challenge to easy notions
of binarity, putting into question the category of 'female' and 'male,'
whether they are considered essential or constructed, biological or cul-
tural, [but also as a challenge to other] binary thinking."' 0 Garber elabo-
rates that the cross dresser signals a "third" category that throws into ques-
tion all binaries, revealing a "category crisis," which Garber defines as:
[A] failure of definitional distinction, a borderline that becomes per-
meable, that permits of border crossings from one (apparently distinct)
category to another: black/white, Jew/Christian, noble/bourgeois, mas-
96. Anne Herrmann, "Passing" Women, Performing Men, in THE FEMALE BODY: FIGURES,
STYLES, SPECULATIONS 178-82 (L. Goldstein ed., 1991).
97. Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1602-03 (1986).
98. BUTLER, supra note 2, at vii.
99. GARBER, supra note 13, at 151.
100. GARBER, supra note 13, at 7.
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ter/servant, master/slave. The binarism male/female, one apparent
ground of distinction (in contemporary eyes, at least) between "this"
and "that," "Him" and "me," is itself put in question or under erasure
in transvestism, and a transvestite figure, or a transvestite mode, will
always function as a sign of overdetermination-a mechanism of dis-
placement from one blurred boundary to another. '01
Applying Garber's analysis, the Divine/John Travolta character in Hair-
spray plays not just for comedy-for that "Check out that dude in a
dress!" moment-but also as a figure that foregrounds the artificiality of
the division at the core of Hairspray-racially segregated dancing-to in-
clude other questionable divisions as well, such as those between male and
female, fat and thin, rich and poor, straight and gay. Dil serves a similar
function in The Crying Game. Dil, who after all is biracial, not only prob-
lematizes our assumptions about male/female, but also about black/white,
about Irish/English, about victim/aggressor, about natural/unnatural, about
nature/nurture.
Even the turn of the century minstrel shows, oddly enough, can be de-
scribed as contestative of categories. After all, minstrel shows included
not only males performing in blackface (crossing race), but those same
performers often performing in drag as the white daughters of plantation
owners, in drag and blackface as "plantation yellow girls," i.e., mulatto
female slaves, and finally, as white northern women agitating for rights
(crossing gender).'02 On the surface, minstrel shows clearly served to reify
race-based and sex-based hierarchies. On another level, however, they too
functioned to problematize binary categories since many of the performers
were in fact ethnic immigrants who, as Michael Rogin has persuasively
argued, used blackface and cross dress as a way of subtly challenging, and
specifically broadening the definition of whiteness.0 3 As a way of be-
coming white too.
So as Garber puts it, "One of the cultural functions of the transvestite is
precisely to mark this kind of displacement, substitution, or slippage: from
class to gender, gender to class; or, equally plausibly, from gender to race
or religion. The transvestite is both a signifier and that which signifies the
undecidability of signification."'0 4
But this is what I want to suggest: It is not only the transvestite who sig-
101. GARBER, supra note 13, at 16.
102. BULLOUGH & BULLOUGH, supra note 18, at 233; ROBERT C. TOLL, BLACKING UP: THE
MINSTREL SHOW IN NINETEENTH CENTURY AMERICA 142 (1974).
103. MICHAEL ROGIN, BLACKFACE, WHITE NOISE: JEWISH IMMIGRANTS IN THE HOLLYWOOD
MELTING POT (1996); Michael Rogin, Making America Home: Racial Masquerade and Ethnic Assimi-
lation in the Transition to Talking Pictures, 79 J. AMER. HIST. 1050 (1992); Michael Rogin, Blackface,
White Noise: The Jewish Jazz Singer Finds His Voice, 18 CRITICAL INQUIRY 420 (1992).
104. GARBER, supra note 13, at 37.
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nals this category crisis, and in doing so problematizes the usefulness of
the categories at issue. Rather, anyone who crosses in the broader sense,
i.e., by adopting an appearance that crosses socio-cultural boundaries, can
also signal a category crisis, and in doing so destabilize hierarchical as-
sumptions. °5 Thus, when Cheryl Harris, in her seminal article "White-
ness as Property," describes her grandmother's daily transformation from
black (at home) to white (at the department store where, in order to get a
job, she passed as white),'06 or law professor Judy Scales-Trent describes
her own repeated crossings as a black woman who looks white,0 7 these
crossings problematize the very usefulness of the categories black and
white. When Paulette Caldwell describes the different reactions occa-
sioned by her hairstyle, depending on whether her hair is braided, in an
"Angela Davis" afro, or pulled back in a ponytail, it problematizes her
status as a black woman professor.108  When Kenji Yoshino describes
adopting preppy clothes in order to "cover" as American at his New Eng-
land prep school, "outprep[ping] the preps, dressing out of catalogues that
featured no racial minorities," it calls into question the valence of the
terms Asian-American and American. 0 9 When Margaret Montoya de-
scribes donning Catholic school uniforms as a "disguise which concealed"
her working class status, and then later as an adult, using "dress to fade
into the ideological, political cultural background rather than proclaim my
difference," it throws into question the usefulness of class categories. 110
So I'm back to clothes again. The power of clothes. Of appearances.
I'm thinking of paper dolls again. Paper dolls, and Virginia Woolf s
bildungsroman Orlando, her transmogrification of As You Like It. In
Woolf s novel, Orlando, born male, awakes from a dream female, and
thereafter changes genders by changing clothes. As Carroll Smith-
Rosenberg has observed, Orlando "tricks us into abandoning all that we
know: that sex is unchangeable, gender distinctions 'natural,' time confin-
ing, and patriarchy invincible. For a brief moment, as Orlando frees us,
105. Although this Article focuses on cross dressers, other figures also have the potential to signal
category crises. Barbara Babcock, for example, places clowns and tricksters alongside transvestites in
this regard. See Babcock, supra note 89. A few years ago, I attended the opening of an exhibit at the
New Museum of Contemporary Art in New York that examined depictions of muscular women. See
PICTURING THE MODERN AMAZON (Joanna Frueh, Laurie Fierstein, & Judith Stein eds,, 2000) (exhibi-
tion catalogue). At the show's opening, female body builders performed and circulated among the
guests. This display of "female masculinity" also signaled a category crisis. The term "female mascu-
linity" comes from Judith Halberstam. See JUDITH HALBERSTAM, FEMALE MASCULINITY (1998).
106. Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REv. 1707, 1708-09 (1993).
107. JUDY SCALES-TRENT, NOTES OF A WHITE BLACK WOMAN (1995).
108. Paulette M. Caldwell, A Hairpiece: Perspectives on the Intersection of Race and Gender,
1991 DUKE L.J. 367.
109. YOSHINO, supra note 24, at 120.
110. Margaret E. Montoya, Mdscaras, Trenzas, y Grefias: Un/masking the Self While Un/braiding
Latina Stories and Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 185, 187 (1994).
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we revel in the headiness of what might be.""'. Paper dolls, Orlando, and
that scene in The Great Gatsby, that great American novel, that novel of
whiteness, in which three blacks-"two bucks and a girl"-outfitted in the
accoutrements of whiteness drive past the narrator, Nick Carraway. The
crossing here signals not only the ability to disrupt race and class, but the
pleasure of new possibilities. Because the scene is brief, I quote it in full
below:
As we crossed Blackwell's Island a limousine passed us, driven by a
white chauffeur, in which sat three modish negroes, two bucks and a
girl. I laughed aloud as the yolks of their eyeballs rolled toward us in
haughty rivalry.
"Anything can happen now that we've slid over this bridge," I
thought; "anything at all.. .. "
Even Gatsby could happen, without any particular wonder." 2
The scene is so brief it could be a throwaway, an aside, something
tossed in for humor. But that would be to underestimate Fitzgerald.
"[T]wo bucks and a girl," "modish" dress, a limousine, a white chauffer.
Anything indeed.
In her highly influential Gender Trouble, Judith Butler asks, "What per-
formance where will invert the inner/outer distinction and compel a radical
rethinking of the psychological presuppositions of gender identity and
sexuality? What performance where will enact and reveal the performa-
tivity of gender in a way that destabilizes the naturalized categories of
identity and desire."' 1 3 Allow me to re-ask these questions and then some.
What happens when we disrupt gender assumptions by dressing a male in
women's clothing and make-up, or a female in men's clothing? What
happens when we disrupt gender/race/status assumptions by dressing a
waitress as a social worker, or a police officer in civilian clothes, or a
wealthy person in the clothes of a poor person, or a white person in
"black" clothes or a black person in "white" clothes?" 4 For that matter,
what happens when we transpose white and black, male and female,
111. CARROLL SMITH-ROSENBERG, DISORDERLY CONDUCT: VISIONS OF GENDER IN VICTORIAN
AMERICA 291 (1985) (emphasis added).
112. F. SCOTT FITZGERALD, THE GREAT GATSBY 69 (Scribner 2004) (1925).
113. BUTLER, supra note 2, at 177. Butler proposed drag as one such performance.
114. Many of these questions have already been raised, both directly and indirectly, by visual art-
ists. For example, in her landmark body of work Untitled Film Stills, Cindy Sherman photographed
herself dressed as specific female types from imagined black and white movies. In doing so, she
mapped a typology of gender roles allowed women in postwar America. See PETER GALASSI &
CINDY SHERMAN: THE COMPLETE UNITITLED FILM STILLS (2003). For his part, Yinka Shonibare has
reimagined and collapsed the idea of race and national identity by creating sculpted tableaux of figures
in clothing that is Victorian in style, but fashioned from Africanized fabrics. See YINKA SHONIBARE,
YINKA SHONIBARE: DOUBLE DRESS (2002). For more on the exploration of the meanings of dress by
contemporary visual artists, see Nina Felshin, Clothing as Subject, ART J., Spring 1995, at 20-29.
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straight and gay, the police and the policed?' These questions seem par-
ticularly important at this time in the criminal arena, when racial profiling
remains a fact of life," 6 when class profiling has been documented," 7
when even judges have been shown to engage in race-based and sex-based
discriminatory sentencing, 118 when the law enforcement resources allo-
cated to investigating crime often turn on the race, gender, and status of
the victim," 9 and when whether a defendant is facing the death penalty
still turns on the race and gender of his victim. 2 0 We all have implicit bi-
ases about gender, about race, about class, about sexuality.' 2 ' Indeed,
these implicit biases exist even in individuals who express strongly egali-
tarian views."'2 At this point in time, what does it mean to look at the new
person we have created, this imaginary person who is both who he/she
was and who she/he could be, who is both there and not there, and sud-
denly be cognizant of gender/race/status in a way we were not before?
What does it mean to use the body as a palimpsest? What does it mean to
first see, and then see through, the surface of things?'23 What does it
115. To put this differently, and to again invoke the idea of paper dolls, what happens when, in
lieu of switching the paper outfits, we instead switch dolls, a black doll for a white doll, a male doll for
a female doll, and so on.
116. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing the Fourth Amendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946
(2002); Anthony C. Thompson, Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 956 (1999).
117. Studies suggests that police officers are significantly less likely to search vehicles driven by
those with above average incomes than vehicles driven by those with below average incomes. See,
e.g., Patrick T. Kinkade & Mathew C. Leone, The Effects of "Tough " Drunk Driving Laws on Polic-
ing: A Case Study, 38 CRIME & DELINQ. 239 (1992).
118. See William T. Pizzi, Irene V. Blair, & Charles M. Judd, Discrimination in Sentencing on the
Basis of Afrocentric Features, 10 MICH. J. RACE & L. 327 (2005).
119. Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715 (2006).
120. See David C. Baldus, Charles A. Pulaski, Jr. & George Woodworth, Comparative Review of
Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 661
(1983). See also Adam Liptak, Death Penalty Found More Likely When Victim is White, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2003, at A12.
121. Using implicit association tests (IATs), which measure the speed with which an individual
associates a categorical status with a characteristic, social cognition researchers have shown that im-
plicit biases continue to be widespread. As one researcher has observed:
By now almost a hundred studies have documented people's tendency to automatically associate
positive characteristics with their ingroups more easily than outgroups (i.e., ingroup favoritism)
as well as their tendency to associate negative characteristics with outgroups more readily than
ingroups (i.e., outgroup derogation).
Nilanjana Dasgupta, Implicit Ingroup Favoritism, Outgroup Favoritism, and their Behavioral Mani-
festations, 17 SOC. JUST. RES. 143, 146 (2004).
122. See, e.g., IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND
GENDER DISCRIMINATION 427 (2001) (noting that even professed liberals can show significant im-
plicit biases on implicit association tests). As Linda Krieger has noted, "even the well-intentioned will
inexorably categorize along racial, gender, and ethnic lines." Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Employment Opportunity,
47 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1217 (1995).
123. My prior work, I realize now, focused on what we see. See, e.g., I. Bennett Capers, On Andy
Warhol's Electric Chair, 94 CAL. L. REV. 243, 258 (2006) (suggesting that Warhol poses an important
question about the death penalty, one that implicates race, gender, religion, disability, age, and com-
fort: "Who are we comfortable visualizing in the chair?"). This Article hopefully moves beyond that
to focus on what we can see through.
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mean to imagine, if just for a moment, an inverted world, a reversible
world, like a Bruegel painting come to life? 124 What does it mean to ask,
what if, and why not?
The narrator in The Great Gatsby suggests anything can happen. Or-
lando promises the headiness of what might be.
III. SERIOUS WORK
[L]et us pervert good sense and make thought play outside the ordered
category of resemblances.
-Michel Foucault 2
5
Love the drag, darling, but your purse is on fire.
-Tallulah Bankhead, addressing a robed thurifer swinging his incense
vessel in an Anglican church. 126
I ended the last section by suggesting that anything can happen when we
engage in the imaginative act of cross dressing, of dressing one thing as
another, of transposing one thing for another. I suggested the headiness of
what might be. In fact, what I am proposing here is both ambitious and
simple: just as cross gender dressing can prompt us to see and see through
implicit biases about gender, cross dressing in its broader sense can
prompt us to see and see through other category biases, including those
about race, class, sexuality, and status. Like actual cross gender dressing,
which prompts the viewer to see both what is there and what is not there-
male, male and female, female-imaginative cross dressing permits the
decision maker to see both the present and the imagined. And in doing so,
it permits the decision maker to reexamine assumptions about both. After
all, as social psychologist Nilanjana Dasgupta has observed, implicit bi-
ases do not inevitably result in biased conduct or biased decisions.
"[E]ven when stereotypes and prejudices are automatically activated,
whether or not they will bias behavior depends on how aware people are
of the possibility of bias, how motivated they are to correct potential bias,
and how much control they have over the specific behavior."' 27 Cross
dressing-as an imaginative act, as a metaphor, and as a practice-is a
means of making decision makers aware of the possibility of bias. Fur-
thermore, because I am suggesting state-sanctioned encouragement of
imaginative acts of cross dressing, decision makers may also be motivated
124. For an excellent discussion of the power of symbolic inversion, see the essays, and espe-
cially the introduction, in THE REVERSIBLE WORLD: SYMBOLIC INVERSION IN ART AND SOCIETY
(Barbara A. Babcock ed., 1978).
125. Michel Foucault, Theatrum Philosophicum, 28 CRITIQUE 898 (1970).
126. GARBER, supra note 13, at 210.
127. Dasgupta, supra note 121, at 157.
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to correct potential biases so that they can override them. In this sense,
imaginative acts of cross dressing others might function as something akin
to John Rawls's "veil of ignorance." 12 8  Something akin to Rawls in
drag. 129
My claim is a bold one, but not entirely without precedent, especially
when it comes to race. In a now famous experiment, a teacher in a small
Iowa town divided her all-white third grade class into blue-eyed and
brown-eyed groups, and in doing so, taught them about what it means to
be discriminated against because of color. 30 More recently, the ACLU
ran an ad to sensitize Americans to the harm caused by racial profiling.
They accomplished this by contrasting photographs of two men, one
white, one black, treated differently by the police. In fact, due to the
magic of photographic manipulation, the two men where phenotypically
identical but for their skin color. 3' In the film A Time to Kill,'32 the jury
returns a just verdict in a racially charged case only after one of the jurors
proposes transposing the race of the defendant and the victims. Indeed,
one of the claims of the law-and-literature movement, at least the law-in-
literature strain, is that imagining ourselves in the shoes of others allows
an empathetic understanding crucial to justice.' 33  Still more recently,
Cynthia Lee, in her provocative book Murder and the Reasonable Man,
suggested that in determining reasonableness in self-defense and provoca-
tion cases, jurors be instructed to engage in a switching exercise, 134 an in-
struction at least one court has given. 135  Lee argues that such switching
would provide "a practical way to address problems with the reasonable-
ness requirement, avoiding problems that arise from oversubjectivization
of the reasonable person standard."'' 36 And arguably, such switching is
implicit in analyzing employment discrimination cases. 131
128. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 12, 136-42 (1972). In this seminal book, Rawls
propounds a "thought experiment" in which citizens divest themselves of all self-interested knowl-
edge, including knowledge of their gender, wealth, race, and other social circumstances, in order to
reach legitimate principles of justice. The point of the "veil of ignorance" is "to represent equality
between human beings as moral persons, and creatures having a conception of their good and capable
of a sense ofjustice." Id. at 19.
129. I thank Markus Dubber for this turn of phrase.
130. See WILLIAM PETERS, A CLASS DIVIDED (1971).
131. ACLU, DRIVING WHILE BLACK 5 (1999).
132. A TIME TO KILL (Warner Brothers 1996).
133. See, e.g., MARTHA NUSSBAUM, POETIC JUSTICE: THE LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC
LIFE 58, 93 (1995).
134. CYNTHIA LEE, MURDER AND THE REASONABLE MAN 12 (2003); see also Cynthia Kwen
Yung Lee, Race and Self-Defense: Toward a Normative Conception of Reasonableness, 81 MINN. L.
REV. 367 (1996). Other scholars have also suggested a type of switching in addressing the reasonable
person standard. See, e.g., CAROLINE A. FORELL & DONNA M. MATHEWS, A LAW OF HER OWN: THE
REASONABLE WOMAN AS A MEASURE OF MAN, at xvii (2000).
135. LEE, supra note 134, at 258 (citing Alaska v. Lockhart, No. 3AN-S96-2362).
136. Id. at 12.
137. E.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (when a plaintiff proves gender
played a part in an employment decision, the defendant may avoid liability by proving, by a prepon-
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My interest here is in exploring how the imaginative act of cross-
dressing can both address and re-dress the effect of implicit biases in the
criminal arena. Because our implicit biases manifest themselves not only
in assessing reasonableness in self-defense or provocation cases, and not
only in the jury deliberation room, what I am suggesting goes well beyond
Cynthia Lee's proposal that jurors engage in switching exercises in self-
defense and provocation cases. What I am suggesting-admittedly in
broad strokes, admittedly in rough outline-is nothing less than the use of
imaginative acts of cross dressing at all stages of a criminal case by all in-
dividuals involved in the criminal justice system.'38 Just consider what
justice might look like if law enforcement officers, prosecutors, jurors, and
even judges engaged in switching exercises-or imaginative acts of cross
gender/race/class/status dressing-with respect to suspects, defendants,
victims, witnesses. 139
Imagine the implications for cases involving sexual assault. In a 1977
Wisconsin case, the trial judge sentenced a defendant who pleaded guilty
to second-degree sexual assault to a one-year suspended sentence. The
court made clear that it was imposing a light sentence because of the fif-
teen-year old complainant's dress at the time of the rape. The judge called
for women to "stop teasing" and for a "restoration of modesty in dress,"
and intimated that the defendant, seeing the way the complainant was
dressed, had reacted "normally."' 40 In a 1989 Florida rape case, jurors ac-
quitted a defendant charged with abducting a victim at knife-point outside
of a restaurant, and repeatedly raping her over a five-hour period. In post-
derance of the evidence, that it would have made the same decision if it had not taken gender into ac-
count).
138. My suggestion that decision makers engage in imaginative acts of cross dressing others is
not entirely without antecedent in criminal law. Every time a decision maker is required to apply a
reasonable person standard, or answer what is reasonable, that decision maker is engaging in an
imaginative act, imagining what a fictional reasonable person in the defendant's situation would have
done. For more on this imaginative process, see MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, THE SENSE OF JUSTICE:
EMPATHY IN LAW AND PUNISHMENT 128-32 (2006). Instructing jurors to imaginatively cross dress
others in order to address and redress biases is also consistent with Alexis de Tocqueville's vision of
the jury as a democratizing institution that educates jurors about the meaning of good citizenship. See
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 275 (J.P. Mayer ed., Doubleday 1969) (1840).
139. First, this would prompt decision makers to conduct a self-evaluation to ascertain whether
biases have played a role in their decision making. If the decision maker reaches the same decision
when the suspect/victim/participant is switched, then it is unlikely that the decision is tainted by bias.
On the other hand, if the decision maker finds that his or her decision is different when a characteristic
of the suspect/victim/participant is crossed, then bias may be present. However, the presence of bias
should not end the matter. Rather, if the decision maker determines that his or her decision is the
product of bias, then the decision maker should next determine whether that bias is inappropriate, or
appropriate. Inappropriate bias should prompt the decision maker to reconsider his or her decision.
Even then, the decision maker would have the discretion to let his or her decision stand. What I hope,
however, is that many decision makers, once aware of any inappropriate implicit biases, will be moti-
vated to override those biases in their decision making. Such an instruction in the jury context, though
novel, would be consistent with the court's obligation to insure a fair, impartial trial.
140. Simonson v. United Press Int'l, Inc., 654 F.2d 478 (7th Cir. 1981) (affirming summary judg-
ment for press in subsequent defamation case brought by the judge); Rape and Culture: Two Judges
Raise the Question of the Victim's Responsibility, TIME, Sept. 12, 1977, at 41.
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trial interviews, jurors explained that they acquitted the defendant because
they believed the complainant, who was dressed in a lace mini-skirt with-
out underwear at the time of the attack, was the one at fault. 14' According
to the jury foreperson: "We felt she asked for it for the way she was
dressed."142 Another juror added, "She was obviously dressed for a good
time." 143 More recently, when professional basketball player Kobe Bryant
was accused of rape, a tabloid newspaper ran a prom photo of his accuser
raising her prom dress to reveal a garter belt. The accompanying headline
read: "Kobe Bryant's Accuser: Did She Really Say No?"' 14
The fact is that too many of us, and that includes judges, prosecutors,
and police officers, still believe that women who are raped dress or behave
in a "seductive manner" and that rape could be reduced by "encouraging
women to dress and behave less seductively."' 145 In cases like these, deci-
sion makers are sometimes aware of their biases; other times they are not.
Now imagine a cross dressing instruction that would direct decision mak-
ers to actually examine their biases and either determine that their biases
are appropriate, or inappropriate. Some individuals, faced with the reali-
zation that they would not acquit a defendant where there was proof that
he kidnapped a complainant from a parking lot, and repeatedly penetrated
her over the course of five hours, had the complainant been, say, a mother
of two dressed modestly, would examine their biases and nonetheless con-
clude, wrongly or rightly, that their biases are fine. These individuals
would conclude that dress should matter, and that the complainant's dress,
and hence status, is probative of her consent. Other individuals, however,
engaging in the same cross dressing exercise, would conclude that their
biases about dress and status are inappropriate, and would choose to over-
ride their biases and reexamine their decision. In short, such imaginative
acts of cross dressing can mean the difference between a just verdict or an
unjust one.
Nor need such imaginative acts of cross dressing be limited to actual
dress. After all, imaginative acts of cross dressing can and should include
cross gender dressing. In recent years, women convicted of molesting un-
141. See, e.g., Jury Blames Woman's Clothing in Rape Case, UPI, Oct. 5, 1989; Rape Victim to
Blame, Says Jury, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Oct. 6, 1989, at 3.
142. Jury: Woman in Rape Case "Asked For It", CHI. TRIB., Oct. 6, 1989, at 11.
143. Id.
144. Kobe Bryant's Accuser: Did She Really Say No?, GLOBE, Oct. 31, 2003, at 1; see also Re-
becca Traister, Did Bonnie Fuller Really Betray Women?: Female Editors Condemn the Globe for
Running Tawdry Photos of Kobe Bryant's Accuser, SALON, Oct. 31, 2003.
145. L.G. Calhoun, J.W. Selby, A. Cann, & G.T. Keller, The Effects of Victim Physical Attrac-
tiveness and Sex of Respondent on Social Reactions to Victims of Rape, 17 BRIT. J. SOC. & CLIN.
PSYCHOL. 191 (1978); Shirley Feldman-Summers & Gayle C. Palmer, Rape as Viewed by Judges,
Prosecutors, and Police Officers, 7 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 19, 28 (1980). See also Elizabeth Snead,
Do Women's Clothes Invite Rape?, USA TODAY, Apr. 19, 1990, at 6D (finding almost one in three
people surveyed believed behavior and dress contribute to rape); Luginbuhl & Courtney Mullin, Rape
and Responsibility: How and How Much is the Victim Blamed?, 7 SEx ROLES 547 (1981).
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der-aged boys have received extraordinarily light sentences. 146 Imagina-
tive cross dressing could direct decision makers-prosecutors, jurors,
judges-to cross dress the defendant by imagining her male instead of fe-
male, and then to cross dress the victim by imagining him female instead
of male. Imaginative cross dressing would prompt decision makers to ex-
amine what biases are present and whether those biases are legitimate (i.e.,
an adult woman molesting a young boy is not the same thing as an adult
man molesting a young boy or a young girl) or illegitimate (i.e., an adult
woman molesting a young boy is the same thing as an adult man molest-
ing a young boy or a young girl). 147
Or consider United States v. Martha Stewart. 48 In 2004, Martha Stew-
art, the self-made queen of domesticity, was convicted of conspiracy, ob-
struction of agency proceedings, and making false statements in connec-
tion with statements she made to the FBI. At the time, the FBI was
conducting an insider trading investigation relating to her sale of 3,928
shares of ImClone common stock just one day before ImClone publicly
announced that it had been denied regulatory approval of its lead product,
the cancer drug Erbitux. 149 Stewart's selection for prosecution and subse-
quent conviction were met by a fusillade of complaints that she was being
targeted not so much because of her statements to the FBI, but because of
her status as "(1) a woman, (2) a member and financial supporter of the
Democratic party, (3) a public figure, or (4) a combination of some or all
of the foregoing."' 50 The perception that she was cold, dismissive of her
employees, and overly aggressive could also be added to this list. I'I More-
over, after the jury returned its guilty verdict, it was revealed that jurors
had spent part of their deliberations discussing Stewart's expensive ward-
146. Mary Kay Letourneau and Debra LaFave are probably the most well known examples. Mary
Kay Letourneau received a sentence of only three month's imprisonment for repeatedly having sex
with a thirteen-year old boy. Debra LaFave, who repeatedly had sex with a fourteen-year boy, fared
even better. She was sentenced to only three years of house arrest. For more on the different fates
faced by female molesters, see J. Hetherton & L. Beardsall, Decisions and Attitudes Concerning Child
Sexual Abuse: Does the Gender of the Perpetrators Make a Difference to Child Protection Profes-
sionals?, 22 CHILD ABUSE & NEGLECT 12 (1998) (finding cases involving female offenders less likely
to result in arrest or prosecution).
147. For example, in Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, the Supreme Court upheld
California's gender-specific statutory rape law on the ground that girls, but not boys, faced the risk of
pregnancy. See Michael M. v. Superior Court of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464 (1981). Nothing in
the Court's ruling, however, would preclude legislators from rejecting a gender-based approach in
fashioning a statutory rape law, or prevent other decision makers (prosecutors, jurors, judges) from
rejecting such an approach.
148. United States v. Martha Stewart, 433 F.3d 273 (2d Cir. 2006).
149. Id. at 280. Stewart was sentenced to five months' incarceration, to be followed by two
years' supervised release. Her conviction was affirmed on appeal. Id. at 318-20.
150. Joan MacCleod Heminway, Save Martha Stewart? Observations About Equal Justice in U.S.
Insider-Trading Regulation, 12 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 247, 251 (2003).
151. On a certain level, Stewart's selection for prosecution was interpreted as a way she could be
"put in [her] place." See Markus D. Dubber, The New Police Science and the Police Power Model of
Criminal Process, in THE NEW POLICE SCIENCE: THE POLICE POWER IN DOMESTIC AND
INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 126 (Markus D. Dubber & Mariana Valverde eds., 2006).
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robe, and in particular the high price of a handbag that Stewart carried to
court-a Birkin bag by Hermes that sells for $6,000 to $80,000. 152 As one
commentator put it, the Birkin bag "cemented an image of her as a pam-
pered fat cat seemingly willing to snatch money from Average Joe Stock-
holder." '153
Now imagine both prosecutors and jurors had engaged in a cross dress-
ing exercise to decide which biases were appropriate and which were in-
appropriate, and to either stand by or change their decisions accordingly.
Take, for example, Stewart's purse. Engaging in cross class dressing, ju-
rors could have asked themselves whether they would have reached the
same verdict if Martha Stewart were not a millionaire several times over
who carries a Birkin purse, but instead someone who was not wealthy-a
secretary, for example-someone who instead carried a relatively inex-
pensive purse purchased from The Gap, or H&M Department Store. In
other words, was their guilty verdict the result of class bias? They could
have asked themselves whether they would have reached the same verdict
if Martha Stewart were instead a male defendant, a hypothetical "Mark"
Stewart with a briefcase instead of a Martha Stewart with a handbag. This
imaginative act of cross gender dressing would have alerted jurors to
whether their verdict was the result of sex or gender bias. Similarly, jurors
could have asked themselves whether they would have reached the same
verdict were she not a public figure.
There are also implications for cases where racial bias may exist on
multiple levels. Consider the O.J. Simpson case, which continues to en-
gender controversy. The fact that the jury that acquitted Simpson was
comprised of nine blacks, two whites, and one Hispanic,' 54 has contrib-
uted to the impression that Simpson's acquittal was due to the racial com-
position of the jury, and not the evidence. 55 The point here is not to weigh
in on Simpson's guilt or innocence. Rather, the point is to observe that
how Simpson was perceived, guilty or innocent, murderer or victim, is in-
separable from implicit biases we hold, including biases about race. As in
the Martha Stewart example, engaging in imaginative cross dressing, in
this case cross race dressing, would have allowed jurors (and the public) to
152. Alex Kuczynski, On This Accessory, the Jury isn't Out, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2004, at C2.
The jurors also discussed the hourly fee Stewart was paying her attorney. United States v. Stewart,
317 F. Supp. 2d 426, 429 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
153. Kucynski, supra note 152, at C2. Although Stewart moved for a new trial on the ground that
the jury had improperly discussed extraneous information, the court denied this motion. The court
found that there could not have been any prejudice since, among other things, jurors were already
aware of Stewart's status as a "wealthy woman." See Stewart, 317 F.Supp.2d at 428.
154. See Jeffrey Rosen, The Bloods and the Crits: O.J Simpson, Critical Race Theory, and the
Triumph of Color in America, NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 9, 1996, at 27, 36 (describing racial composition
of jury).
155. See, e.g., Mona Charen, It's Foolish to Think Simpson Verdict Wasn't Racially Motivated,
IDAHO STATESMEN, Oct. 16, 1995 (editorial).
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run a check on their implicit biases. Instructed by the court to engage in
imaginative acts of cross dressing, jurors might have realized that they
would have been inclined to reach a guilty verdict had Simpson been
white, or had his ex-wife or Ron Goldman been black. Similarly, they
may have been inclined to reach a different verdict had Fuhrman been
non-white. These jurors would then be prompted to ask themselves
whether the different results are the result of a legitimate bias, or an ille-
gitimate bias. Again, this could have made the difference between an un-
just verdict, and a just one.
I end with McCleskey v. Kemp,156 a death penalty case that has troubled
scholars since it was decided. '57 In McCleskey, a Georgia jury comprised
of eleven whites and one black convicted Warren McCleskey of killing
Frank Schlatt, a police officer, during the course of a robbery, and recom-
mended a sentence of death. McCleskey was black. Schlatt was white. ' 8
On these facts alone, there was nothing atypical about the case. To the
contrary, it fit the teleological narrative of hundreds of death penalty
cases. What made the case unique, however, was that McCleskey's law-
yers challenged the Georgia capital sentencing system in a way no one had
previously done. They introduced a statistical study that showed that the
imposition of the death penalty in Georgia depended in great part on the
race of the victim: prosecutors sought the death penalty in seventy percent
of the cases involving black defendants and white victims, but only fifteen
percent of the cases involving black defendants and black victims."'5 De-
fendants charged with killing white persons were sentenced to death in
eleven percent of the cases, but defendants charged with killing blacks
were sentenced to death in only one percent of the cases. ' 60 After taking
account of thirty-nine variables that could have explained the disparities
on nonracial grounds, the study concluded that defendants charged with
killing white victims are 4.3 times as likely to receive the death sentence
as defendants charged with killing black victims. Citing this evidence,
McCleskey claimed that every stage of his prosecution-from the prose-
cutor's decision to seek the death penalty, to the jury's decision to recom-
mend a sentence of death-was likely tainted by racial discrimination in
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. And faced with so
broad a challenge, the Court concluded that McCleskey's claim "must
fail.' 161 Writing for the 5-to-4 majority, Justice Powell observed that,
156. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
157. Perhaps no one has been more critical of the Court's decision than Randall Kennedy. See
Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101
HARV. L. REv. 1388 (1988).
158. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 283.
159. Id. at 287.
160. Id. at 286.
161. Id.at292.
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notwithstanding the apparent validity of the study, McCleskey had not
shown, and could not show, that purposeful racial discrimination had con-
clusively played a role in his case, the sine qua non of an equal protection
claim. 162 Finally, noting that "[a]pparent disparities in sentencing are an
inevitable part of our criminal justice system," the Court held that
McCleskey's statistical evidence did not demonstrate a "constitutionally
significant risk" of racial bias to establish an Eighth Amendment viola-
tion. 163 To rule otherwise, the Court concluded, would mean an overhaul
of our long tradition of prosecutorial and juror discretion, and could lead
to other challenges based on other biases.164 In September 1991, the state
of Georgia executed Warren McCleskey. 165
The result of the Court's decision in McCleskey is simple. As Justice
Brennan stated in his dissent, a candid attorney representing a death eligi-
ble defendant in Georgia would tell his client that few of the details of the
crime matter; what matters is the race of the victim, and that "race would
play a prominent role in determining if he lived or died."1 66 Imaginative
acts of cross dressing, however, offer a solution that neither overhauls the
discretion of prosecutors, nor the discretion of jurors. Instead, it asks only
that jurors, before they report their verdict, imagine a what if. What if the
victim were a different race? What if the defendant were a different
race? 167 It asks only that jurors imagine McCleskey as white, and his vic-
tim Frank Schlatt as black, and ask themselves would that have mattered.
Would they have still found McCleskey guilty, but recommended a sen-
tence of life imprisonment instead of death? Or would they have reached
the same decision, guilt and death? Even more, imaginative acts of cross
dressing would address the Court's fear that allowing McCleskey's chal-
lenge could open the door to other challenges based on other discrepancies
"that correlate to membership in other minority groups, and even to gen-
der."' 168 After all, as Justice Brennan noted in his dissent, all inappropriate
162. Id. at 292-299. The Court recognized that it had in certain cases, namely in jury selection
cases and in the Title VII context, accepted statistical disparities as proof of an equal protection viola-
tion. However, the Court concluded that given the nature of capital sentencing as dependent on the
discretion of prosecutors and jurors, "exceptionally clear proof' of discrimination would be required to
establish a constitutional violation. Id. at 297.
163. Id. at 312-13.
164. Id. at 314-19.
165. Peter Applebome, Georgia Inmate Is Executed After 'Chaotic' Legal Move, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 26, 1991, at A 18. Since McCleskey, other studies have shown continued disparities in capital
sentencing. Citing McCleskey, however, courts have repeatedly rejected challenges predicated on sta-
tistical discrimination at sentencing. See, e.g., Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417 (6th Cir. 2001);
Davis v. Greer, 13 F.3d 1134 (7th Cir. 1994); State v. Taylor, 929 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. 1996).
166. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
167. This proposal is consistent with the assumption that jurors are less likely to be racially biased
when the issue of race is made explicit, rather than ignored. See, e.g., Samuel R. Sommers & Phoebe
C. Ellsworth, How Much Do We Really Know about Race and Juries? A Review of Social Science
Theory and Research, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 997, 1014 (2003).
168. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 316-17.
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biases should concern us. All inappropriate biases should be repugnant to
our deeply rooted conceptions of fairness. 69 The fact is that men arrested
for murder are six times more likely to be sentenced to death than women
arrested for murder.17°  That too should concern us. The fact is that
women of color and lesbians who commit murder are more likely to face
the death penalty than white heterosexual women who commit murder. 171
That too should concern us. The fact is that the "death penalty is relent-
lessly aimed at poor people."' 172 This too should concern us. Cross dress-
ing, re-imagining, allows us not only to see our biases, but to rise above
them.
And that is the beauty of this project. Cross dressing, after all, is about
more than Norman Bates in Psycho, or Lord Cornbury of New Jersey, or
Joan of Arc, or Shi Pei Pu, or even paper dolls. By acknowledging the
semiotic valence of clothes and appearance, and by tapping into the dis-
ruptive possibilities of cross dressing, we can both see and see through our
biases. This is not to say that such a project would be easy. Indeed, many
questions remain. What would be the limiting principles of such a cross
dressing exercise for jurors, for prosecutors, for law enforcement officers?
Would such exercises apply in civil cases? How would we reconcile such
an exercise with our general admonition not to speculate, to consider only
the facts before us? How would such an exercise play out in context spe-
cific offenses such as hate crimes? And when we cross dress others, to
what extent do we risk depriving those others of agency, of the ability to
dress themselves, present themselves, mask themselves? Again, none of
these questions are easy. But as I hope I have demonstrated, the potential
benefits of such an endeavor in the criminal arena at least-for making it
fairer, and perhaps one day even making it fair-are manifold and rich.
The task ahead requires only that we begin. And imagine.
169. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
170. See Victor L. Streib, Gendering the Death Penalty: Countering Sex Bias in a Masculine
Sanctuary, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 433, 442 (2002). As Joan Howarth has explored, the gender disparity in
executions is attributable, at least in part, to society's general reluctance to execute "presentable, femi-
nine, White wom[e]n." See Joan W. Howarth, Executing White Masculinities: Learning from Karla
Faye Tucker, 81 OR. L. REV. 183, 227 (2002).
171. Kathryn Ann Farr, Aggravating and Differentiating Factors in the Cases of White and Mi-
nority Women on Death Row, 43 CRIME & DELINQ. 260 (1997); Victor L. Streib, Death Penalty for
Lesbians, I NAT'L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 104 (1995).
172. Howarth, supra note 170, at 223.
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